WM TECHNOLOGY, INC
The Last Puff #009
A cannabis marketplace software company generating $37M in annual EBITDA, carrying $62.6M in cash, zero debt, and trading at an enterprise value of roughly $28M. The cash alone covers 68 cents of the 63-cent (when I first started researching, now 75 cents) stock price. You are being asked to pay almost nothing for an operating business that generates more in EBITDA every single year than its total current enterprise value. Either the market is pricing in terminal collapse, or it is simply terrified of the word "cannabis" and cannot hold the position long enough to collect.
This was a Workout when the $1.70 take-private was alive. The founders withdrew in June 2025. The live catalyst has been removed. It now sits in the General bucket, statistically cheap versus intrinsic value, with a latent Workout re-emergence possibility if founders come back or the board acts on capital allocation. I will analyze it as General but keep one eye on the Workout door.
Thesis
The market is valuing the operating business of Weedmaps -- the dominant U.S. cannabis marketplace -- at approximately $28M enterprise value against $37.6M in trailing EBITDA. You are paying 0.7x for a going concern that generates more cash each year than its total enterprise value. The balance sheet is fortress-grade: $62.6M cash, zero meaningful debt, cash growing approximately $10M per 9-month period. The company is not burning; it is accumulating. The founders bid $1.70 six months ago, which validates their own view of intrinsic value. They withdrew on "external factors," not because the business deteriorated. They still run it. They still own 32-39.5% economically. They are still here.
Revenue is declining gently (~5% per year) and ARPU is eroding, but client counts are stable. This is not Sears in 2015. The decline is slow and the cash generation is real. New board members added in February 2026 with capital markets experience are inconsistent with a company resigning itself to irrelevance. Something is being considered.
Intrinsic Value
Per-share math (145M shares assumed):
Cash per share: $62.6M / 145M = $0.43/share
Operating business (ex-cash): $0.63 current price - $0.43 cash = $0.20 for the business
Owner FCF estimate (75% of $37.6M Adj. EBITDA after SBC haircut assumption): ~$28M
Owner FCF per share: $28M / 145M = $0.19/share
You are paying 1.1x owner FCF for the operating business. One year’s earnings pays back your non-cash investment.
In the bear case, 2x owner FCF ($56M EV) = $0.39 business value + $0.43 cash/share = $0.82 IV
In the base case, 4x owner FCF ($112M EV) = $0.77 business value = $0.43 cash/share = $1.20 IV
At $0.63, cash alone is $0.43/share. I do not need to believe in any particular earnings multiple. I am buying $0.43 in cash plus an operating business that throws off $28M in owner FCF annually for $0.20. Even in a liquidation scenario where the operating business is worth zero, I lose 20 cents. In any scenario where the business persists even at half its current earning power, I double my money. The Graham test does the heavy lifting here with a 47.5% margin of safety.
A catalyst exists but is probabilistic: the founders and new board are unlikely to sit on $60M+ in growing cash earning trivial returns with the stock below $0.70 indefinitely. A buyback program, renewed take-private, or strategic sale are all live options. But I do not need a catalyst. Cash builds, business persists, and at 0.7x EBITDA the math eventually forces recognition.
Partners,
Sub-1x EBITDA for a going concern with growing cash and founder skin in the game. I have seen perhaps a dozen of these across my investing career.
However, when insiders control the vote and the economics simultaneously, they define the terms of any exit. The founders set the price at $1.70 - then walked away. A controlling insider can make a minority investor wait indefinitely. I will not concentrate a large % of capital in a situation where the path to value realization runs entirely through the goodwill of a founder who has already demonstrated willingness to withdraw a generous offer when inconvenient.
The arithmetic is extraordinary - sub-1x EBITDA, 68% of stock price in cash, positive net income, growing cash pile, dominant market position in a niche with real switching costs. By pure Graham-Dodd standards, this would be a knock in the park. The grade is docked because: (1) dual-class founder control makes the path to value realization uncertain and founder-dependent; (2) revenue is in structural decline; (3) the take-private withdrawal casts a shadow on management's commitment to minority shareholders. This is a fat pitch with a complicated wind.